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I investigate the consequences for semantics, and in particular for the
semantics of tense, if time is assumed to have a branching structure not
out of metaphysical necessity (to solve some philosophical problem) but
just as a contingent physical fact, as is suggested by a currently-popular
approach to the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
1 Introduction
Aristotle thought that the future was open, in the sense that talk of the future
need be neither true nor false. Prior (1957,1967) modelled this openness by
giving time a branching structure and constructing a branching-time semantics
to match. Thomason (1970), McCall (1984, 1994), Belnap (1992, 2002), and
others concur. In each case their motivation is that certain aspects of our
everyday world, and our discourse about it, can be modelled only by branching
time and branching-time semantics: examples include causality, the objectivity
of possibility and probability, free will, and the intuition to say of things not
yet determined that they are neither true nor false.
But it is, I think, at least as widely believed that such a radical metaphysical
strategy is unnecessary, and that our everyday interactions with time can be
understood perfectly well on the conventional picture of time as non-branching.
If so (and I am myself inclined to think that it is so), philosophy gives us no
reason to take seriously the proposal that time is branching, or to adopt a
semantics of tense which explicitly accommodates branching.
However, it is a non sequitur to suppose that because we are not compelled
to accept a non-branching structure for time, it is not philosophically possible
to accept one. This paper is concerned with what semantics we should adopt
for tensed discourse in a universe in which branching is in fact ubiquitous: its
conclusion is that if we live in a branching universe, we are required to adopt a
branching semantics.
Why take such a supposition seriously in the first place? One important
reason is that ‘new developments in physics’ do indeed give us (some) grounds
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to suspect that time may be branching. In particular, the Everett interpretation
of quantum mechanics (often called the ‘Many-Worlds theory’) makes precisely
that claim: it supposes that whenever we make a measurement of a quantum
system1 the Universe splits into many copies, one2 for each possible outcome of
the experiment.
It is not my purpose here to argue for the truth of the Everett interpretation
(for such arguments, see Wallace (2002, 2003a, 2003b) ). However, true or not,
it is now taken seriously by remarkably many physicists. As such, philosophers
have some obligation to ask, if not is it true, then at least could it be true? That
is, is it a possible physical theory, albeit one which could turn out false? Or
is it metaphysically incoherent, something to be rejected out of hand without
further ado?
One of the more powerful arguments for metaphysical incoherence3 is: how
can it make sense to say, as we habitually do, that we are uncertain of the result
of a quantum measurement when in fact the Everett interpretation tells us with
certainty that the result is a division of the universe into many copies? That is,
how can we reconcile the apparently indeterministic nature of quantum measure-
ments with the apparently deterministic, in-principle-perfectly-knowable nature
of the Everett interpretation?
To expand on the point: suppose an experimenter, asked what he believes
the result of the experiment will be, says ‘Either outcome A or outcome B will
occur, but not both, and I don’t know which.’ This statement (a perfectly
normal response for an experimenter who accepts quantum mechanics) can be
construed as the assertion of
• ‘A will occur or B will occur’, and
• ‘Not both A and B will occur’
together with a refusal to assert either
• ‘A will occur’ or
• ‘B will occur’.
However, if quantum mechanics is supposed to mean that the world branches
in two, with A occurring in one branch and B in the other, it’s unclear how
this can be a reasonable set of assertions to make. Do we take A to occur if it
occurs in some branch (that is, somewhere in the branching Universe)? Then
it cannot be true that not both A and B will occur, nor can it make sense to
plead ignorance as to which will occur (they both will). Or should we take A to
occur if it occurs period, not just occurs-in-some-branch? If so, neither A nor B
1And at many other times when measurement is not occurring, too — one of the appealing
features of the Everett interpretation is that ‘measurement’ plays no essential role in its
formulation.
2Rather more than one, actually; but counting branches is a subtle matter. See Wallace
(2003b) for more discussion of this point.
3Made with some force by Albert and Loewer (1988), amongst others.
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occurs; rather, some alien branching event occurs. Either way, the theory seems
to fit very badly with how experimental physicists actually behave.
Responses to this objection have generally taken one of two forms: either
bite the bullet and accept that we are just wrong when we say that a quantum-
mechanical experiment has an unknown outcome, but try to argue that our
behaviour should remain unchanged nonetheless (Greaves 2004); or try to make
sense of the apparent paradox by appeal to considerations from the philosophy
of personal identity (Saunders 1998). I wish to suggest an alternative possibility:
that the ‘paradox’ is a consequence of mistakes in the philosophy of language.
In particular, it is due to the mistaken application of a semantic theory designed
for a non-branching universe to the discourse of the inhabitants of a branching
universe.
In section 2 I review the semantics of linear and branching time; in section 3
I apply each to a branching universe, and show that linear, but not branching,
semantics imply that if we live in a branching universe then nearly all our
beliefs are trivial, false or meaningless. Section 4 makes the central claim of this
paper: that the linguistic principle of charity entails that branching semantics
are correct for a branching universe. Section 5 addresses the frequently made
objection that talk of ‘uncertainty’, which applies to a branching universe if
branching-time semantics are appropriate, is incoherent in situations where all
the objective facts are known. Section 6–8 develop the technical details of the
proposal, and section 9 is the conclusion.
2 Branching-time semantics: a review
Suppose that time is linear: that is, suppose that it can be represented as some
total ordering < on some set T of ‘times’, to be read as “earlier than”.4 Ut-
terances concerned with time can then be divided in to two classes: tenseless
utterances, such as “p occurs (tenselessly) before q” or “p (tenselessly) occurs
at some time t”, the truth values of which are unaffected by when they are
uttered; and tensed utterances, such as “p has happened” or “q is (now) hap-
pening”, which are true at one time, false at another. Put in terms of sentences
rather than utterances: tenseless sentences (ignoring ambiguity) are true or false
simpliciter, tensed sentences have time-dependent truth values.
There is a well-known relationship between the two sorts of utterance: namely,
a tensed utterance made at a particular time t ∈ T is true iff a certain related
tenseless utterance is true simpliciter. For instance, the tensed utterance “p
will happen”, uttered at time t, is true iff “p happens (tenselessly) at some time
s > t” is true; “p is (now) happening”, uttered at t, is true iff ‘p (tenselessly)
happens at t” is true. In terms of sentences: each ordered pair of a tensed
sentence and a time determines a tenseless sentence; the tensed sentence is true
at that time iff the tenseless sentence is true simpliciter.
4Recall that a total ordering of T is an antisymmetric, irreflexive transitive relation on T
such that for any x, y ∈ T , either x = y, x < y, or x > y.
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Those, such as Prior (1957, 1967), who take tense as metaphysically funda-
mental will, at best, regard this relation between tensed and tenseless sentences
as in some sense definitional of the latter; they might wish to go further and
reject the framework above altogether (or at least regard it as giving merely
the abstract model theory for the logic of tensed utterances). I regard this as
untenable, for unoriginal reasons5, and for the rest of this paper I follow Mellor
(1981, 1998) et al in regarding the content of tensed utterances as exhausted by
an explication of their time-dependent relation to tenseless truthmakers.
What if time is not linear, but branching? Formally, this can be modelled
by relaxing the requirement that the relation < on the set T is a total ordering.
We require instead only that it be a partial ordering6 which in addition satisfies:
1. Connectedness: For any x, y, either x < y, or y < x, or x = y, or for some
z, z < x and z < y.
2. No recombination: If z < x and y < x, then either z < y, or y < z, or
y = z.
Branching structures for time were proposed by Prior (1957) with the intent
of formalising the intuition that (some) future events are not now either true or
false. On the branching-time semantics that Prior advocates, a future-tensed
sentence (say, ‘There will be a sea battle’, to borrow Aristotle’s example) uttered
at t is true iff there is a sea-battle in all branches futurewards of t; false iff there
is a sea-battle in no such branch; neither true nor false otherwise.
More formally (and following Thomason (1970)), define a history as a maxi-
mal totally ordered subset of T . If we restrict our attention just to a particular
history, it looks exactly like the ‘linear time’ we described above. We can easily
say what it is for a tensed sentence uttered at t to be true in some history h
(where h contains t): the sentence is true at t in h if the associated tenseless
sentence is true in h. So in a branching-time picture, the truth values of tensed
sentences must be evaluated not just with reference to a time but with additional
reference to a history; the truth values of tenseless sentences are not absolute,
but require reference to a history. (So ‘There (tenselessly) is a sea battle in 480
BC’ is true in those histories in which there is a sea battle at that date; false
otherwise.)
Actual utterances are made at particular times, but in a branching-time
scenario a time does not pick out a unique history. This gives Prior’s non-
bivalent semantics: a tenseless sentence S uttered at t is true iff it is true in all
histories h with t ∈ h and false iff it is true in no such histories. (Formally, this
is a supervaluational semantics; see Thomason (1970) for technical details). We
will say, neutrally, that S is not knowably true or false at t if S is true in some
but not all histories containing t.
Part of the motivation for branching time was to provide an objective frame-
work for future possibilities. In the linear-time framework then possibility is an
5See Sider (2001, chapter 1) and Mellor (1998) for recent criticisms of the notion of tense
as fundamental.
6i. e. , a transitive, antisymmetric relation.
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epistemic notion: given any two contradictory statements, both may be possible
but one is true and one is false, and both are possible only because we do not
know which is which. If time is branching, however, it is natural to take “it
is possible that p” as true at t whenever p is true in some history containing
t. (This is actually entailed if we assume that (i) every p is either possible or
impossible, and (ii) if something is impossible it is also false). Formal semantics
for ‘it is possible that’ (e. g. Prior (1967)) often take this condition as necessary
and sufficient, but I shall not do so: it will be convenient to remain neutral as
to whether something can be possible but false, as is the case in non-branching
time. (I return to this issue in section 8.)
For clarity, I should note two features of this presentation of branching time:
1. Braching-time pictures are often (e. g. , McCall (1994)) combined with
essentially tensed views of time, so that as time passes various ‘possible’
futures succeed or fail to be actualised. This is not a feature of the branch-
ing time ontology I discuss in this paper: as with my presentation of linear
time, the branching structure is taken to have its structure tenselessly.
2. Even if one did not want to accept branching in the actual structure of
time, it might still be possible to adopt a branching semantics. (One
might, for instance, say that a future-tense sentence was true at t iff true
in all physically possible worlds identical with the actual world up to t,
as is advocated by Lewis (1986, pp. 206–9)) By contrast, the picture of
branching which I wish to consider is explicitly metaphysical: the real
structure of time is branching.
3 Branching time and splitting worlds
Suppose, as does the Everett interpretation, that the universe in which we live
is constantly splitting into copies, so that I have not one unique successor but
many.
A universe like this has a structure formally identical to that of a branching
time. It can be modelled via a set S of ‘instantaneous quasi-classical states’,
corresponding to the sorts of instantaneous states that ‘the classical world’ is
generally taken to have, together with a relation < on S satisfying the same
axioms as we previously required for branching time and interpreted as causal
dependence or some dynamically defined equivalent. Elements of S describe
such things as dead or alive cats, needles on detectors pointing at various deter-
minate values, and so forth; if x ∈ S is a state in which a cat is in a box, y, z are
similar states in which the cat is respectively alive and dead, and x < y, x < z,
∼ y < z and ∼ z < y, then we have a model of the “Schro¨dinger cat” paradox.7
7In quantum mechanics, S consists of time-indexed projectors in some decoherence-defined
basis; 〈P̂ 1, t1〉 < 〈P̂ 2, t2〉 iff t1 < t2 and Tr(P̂ 2 exp(−i/h¯tĤ)P̂ 1 exp(−i/h¯tĤ)) 6= 0. The
splitting process is not part of the fundamental dynamics of the theory, but is emergent from
them; see (Wallace 2003a) for details.
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Are such universes actually examples of branching times? There are two
possibilities:
Yes: elements of S should be identified with times; at each time, the world has
a roughly classical description.
No: despite the formal similarity, the branching structure of worlds should not
be regarded as a branching-time structure. Instead, we should regard it
as having a single, linear time, and having instantaneous states which, far
from being classical, consist of vast numbers of causally isolated classical
sub-worlds.
In a sense, it is a semantic rather than a metaphysical question as to which of
these is correct. The actual structure of the world is not in question (it is given
by the set S and its partial order). The practical consequences of declaring that
this system of branching worlds is a branching-time or linear-time system is,
rather, that we should use branching-time or linear-time semantics respectively
to analyse language use within it.
To elaborate on these remarks: it is of course possible simply to talk about
the branching structure described by the ordering on S, by uttering semantically
unproblematic sentences (in which one might say ‘some points with property P
are futurewards of some points with property Q’ for instance8 Let us call such
utterances ‘branch-talk utterances’ (or utterances of ‘branch-talk sentences’).
Furthermore, branch-talk sentences can unproblematically be uttered from
within the universes that we are considering, and in being made may incor-
porate some unproblematic context dependence, For instance, someone aware
of the branching might say: ‘in the future, I will branch into two copies’. In
this context, the referent of ‘I’ will be the person making the utterance, and
the statement is true if there are two distinct branches through the point at
which the utterance is made, each containing a copy of the person making the
utterance.9
What is in question, however, is not the semantics of branch-talk utterances,
but the semantics of the utterances actually made inside this world: everyday
utterances like ‘it will rain tomorrow’, for instance. It is here that the two
possibilities described above lead to very different answers.
If branching-time semantics are correct, the semantic theory for ordinary
utterances is very familiar: each history (that is, each maximal totally ordered
subset of S) is classical and unbranching, and provides a perfectly conven-
tional (albeit history-dependent) semantics for tenseless sentences, along the
lines spelled out in section 2. A tenseless sentence like “Athens [tenselessly]
hosts the Olympics in 2500 AD” uttered at x ∈ S is true iff it is true in all
histories containing x; ‘Possibly Athens hosts the Olympics in 2500 AD’ is true
at x whenever “Athens hosts the Olympics in 2500 AD’ is true in some history
8In the context of the Everett interpretation, statements like ‘the state of the Universe is
|ψ〉’ are also of this form.
9Certain issues of personal identity, passed over lightly here, will be dealt with in more
detail in section 6.)
6
containing x (and perhaps at some other points as well, since we are leaving it
open the extent to which there is a purely epistemic component to possibility
even in a branching universe). In turn, tensed sentences like ‘it will rain in
Oxford tomorrow’, uttered at a particular time, have the same truth value as
their associated tenseless sentence (‘it [tenselessly] rains in Oxford on the 8th
of December 2005’, were I to utter it now.)
Things are more complicated if we apply linear-time semantics to branching
worlds. Recall that in this case, tenseless sentences are true or false simpliciter,
not true or false relative to histories (equivalently: there is only one history, even
though there are many chains of classical sub-worlds). Tenseless sentences, in
fact, should be ‘God’s-eye’ descriptions of the entire branching structure: the
ideal tenseless sentence would be actually be some ‘branch-structure sentence’
like “Athens hosts the Olympics in some but not all 2500AD-sub-worlds future-
wards of 2005-AD subworld k.”.
Ordinary people do not utter sentences like that, of course (or even tensed
variants of them), so what of ‘ordinary’ tenseless sentences like ‘Athens hosts
the Olympics in 2500AD’? As we have noted in the case of branch-structure
sentences, the content of such sentences will have some contextual dependence
even on linear-time semantics: ‘Athens”, uttered at some subworld k, clearly
refers to the Athens in that subworld or its causally related future subworlds
(much as terms like “Me”, “George” or “the Queen” have denotations which
depend on the context of utterance). Nonetheless, if the basic assumption of
linear-time semantics is to hold then these sorts of utterances should have the
same truth conditions as some context-independent branch-structure sentence.
The trouble is that there are no very inspiring candidates. Some might
include:
• “Athens hosts the Olympics in at least some 2500AD-subworlds future-
wards of 2005-AD subworld k” (where k is the subworld at which “Athens
hosts the Olympics in 2500AD” was uttered), which is almost certainly
true at most plausible k.
• “Athens hosts the Olympics in all 2500AD-subworlds futurewards of 2005-
AD subworld k”, which will no doubt be false at most plausible k.
• “The mereological sum of all copies of Athens in 2500AD-subworlds fu-
turewards of 2005 AD subworld k hosts the Olympics”, which is false since
mereological sums scattered across causally isolated sub-worlds cannot be
said to host sporting events.
But none of these seem naturally equivalent in content to the original utter-
ance, though. None seem to have a great deal of contingency; on the first and
second proposal “Athens hosts the Olympics” and “Athens doesn’t host the
Olympics” do not come out as contradictory; on the third proposal we seem to
be referring to an object which has little to do with our ordinary understanding
of ‘Athens’.10 Perhaps the best strategy to adopt is just to declare “Athens
10cf Lewis’s arguments (Lewis 1986, pp. 209–219) against the relevance of trans-world fusions
to issues of trans-world identity.
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hosts the Olympics in 2500 AD” as meaningless according to the linear-time
semantics, and restrict our usage to more appropriate tenseless sentences like
‘Athens hosts the Olympics in some but not all 2500 AD subworlds futurewards
of this subworld”.
On the linear semantics, it should be apparent, the hypothesis that our world
is branching entails that most of our ordinary beliefs about the future are false,
vacuously true, or just meaningless. It also entails that our ordinary descrip-
tion of quantum theory’s predictions is highly inaccurate: our ordinary reading
of the theory is that the correct attitude to (say) a quantum measurement is
uncertainty as to which measurement result obtains, but under the Everett in-
terpretation it seems that all we can say is that all ‘possible’ measurement
results actually obtain, although only one obtains in each branch.
As was noted in section 1, these radical conclusions have been used by skep-
tics about the interpretation (such as Albert and Loewer (1988) and Barrett
(1999)) to argue that it cannot be taken as explanatory of the empirical data.
They have also been accepted by some advocates of the Everett interpretation
(such as Tappenden (2000), and possibly Greaves (2004)), who make the point
that such a radical change in our ontology ought to have radical consequences
for how we think about the world in general and quantum experiments in par-
ticular.
However, it is important to note that such ‘radical consequences’ only follow
if the appropriate semantics for a branching world is linear-time semantics. If
instead we assume that branching-time semantics are appropriate, virtually all
of our existing beliefs remain intact (the main exceptions are technical state-
ments about the topology of time or the interpretation of quantum mechanics).
Furthermore, the semantics straightforwardly recovers the ordinary description
of measurement: if different measurement results occur on different branches,
then for each possible result r, “r will obtain” is not knowably true or false, and
“r will possibly obtain” is true.
So: the question of whether the Everett interpretation entails massive error
on the part of experimentalists and ordinary people comes down to the question
of what semantics are appropriate for a branching world.
It is not at all obvious that the burden of proof here lies with the advocate
of branching-time semantics. While there has been an extensive debate on the
topology of time within mainstream philosophy, it has been almost exclusively
concerned with whether branching time is necessary to recover some aspect of
the everyday world (freedom of will, objectivity of possibility, causation, etc —
see Prior (1967) and Belnap (2002) for samples of such arguments). I am not
aware of any attempt to argue for the a priori necessity of linear-time semantics.
It is, however, possible to give a more constructive argument in favour of
branching-time semantics for a branching world. The next section will present
it.11
11Alternative arguments, from rather different perspectives, have been proposed by Saun-
ders (1998) and Vaidman (1998); see Wallace (2005) for a critical evaluation.
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4 The charity argument for branching-time se-
mantics
Imagine a certain society, living in a Universe apparently not so different from
ours, in which philosophers and physicists have reached a consensus about the
correct metaphysics and semantics of time. Specifically: the physicists are confi-
dent that their universe is a linear, non-branching reality (whose instantaneous
states are rather like ‘classical states’ of the world in our own universe); the
philosophers are confident that the universe is tenseless at a fundamental level
and that the correct semantics for tensed talk is linear-time semantics as de-
scribed in section 2. In their analysis, ‘possibility’ is an entirely epistemic notion:
there is a unique actual future but other futures are ‘possible’ in a sense that is
ultimately “merely” a matter of the ignorance of individuals about the actual
future.
This notion of possibility can be expanded and quantified by the use of
probabilities: rational natives of the society, the philosophers argue, may be
idealised as assigning a probability between 0 and 1 to the truth of each tense-
less sentence.12 (This in turn may be derived from more primitive, qualitative
assumptions about which sentences they believe are more likely to be true, using
the methods of decision theory; see, e. g. , Jeffrey (1983) and Savage (1972) for
two influential proposals as to how this is to be cashed out; see (Kaplan 1996;
Joyce 1999) for further details.).
The catch is that the natives’ physicists are completely wrong. Their uni-
verse is not, as they believed, described by the evolution of matter in an approx-
imately classical way: in reality it is constantly — trillions of times per second
— branching into quasi-classical sub-worlds, so that their planet and everything
on it is constantly being copied into duplicates almost identical to one another.
Since none of the natives know this, it should be unsurprising that certain
aspects of their world-view are mistaken. The question is: which aspects? There
are two possibilities.
According to the Elite View, despite the errors of the physicists in describ-
ing the physical structure of the world, the philosophers’ analysis of seman-
tics and rationality remains correct. That is: tenseless sentences have history-
independent truth conditions, modulo some referential context-dependence of
terms like ‘Athens’. As we saw in the previous section, there are no candidate
‘branch-talk’ sentences to express such truth-conditions without making most
of our ‘ordinary’ future-directed sentences (like ‘it will rain tomorrow’) triv-
ial or meaningless. Since rationality requires agents to act in accordance with
probabilities over tenseless sentences (again ignoring referential indexicality), it
follows that ‘probability’ remains an essentially epistemic notion, measuring an
agent’s degree of belief in facts which from a God’s-eye view are fixed.
To adopt the Elite View is to continue to apply linear-time semantics to
12I ignore complications raised by the ‘problem of the essential indexical’, and although I
follow Davidson (1990) in ascribing probabilities to the truth of sentences rather than (e. g. )
to propositions, this is purely for convenience and does not affect the argument.
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this universe despite the physicists’ radical discoveries about its structure. This
move reduces to falsehood, triviality or nonsense almost every ordinary opinion
held by natives of this universe.
The alternative Charitable View accepts that the philosophers are wrong in
some important respects in their description of rationality and their linear-time
semantics. Tenseless sentences are true or false not simpliciter but only relative
to a history; actual utterances are therefore to be classified as true, false or
not-knowably-true-or-false as dictated by branching-time semantics.
As such, rational agents should define probabilities to the truth of ‘tense-
less sentences’ understood in this way. The price of this move is of course that
it abandons the idea that (future-directed) beliefs and desires should be inter-
preted in terms of ignorance about, and preferences between, possible tenseless
states of the entire Universe, and that it abandons any attempt to provide de-
terminate truth-values to future-tense sentences. On the other hand, by doing
so, it saves the future-directed beliefs of agents from widespread falsehood. For
instance, suppose someone says ‘in 2500 AD, either Athens will be hosting the
Olympics, or some other city, but not both.’ This can be analysed as having
the tenseless (but history-dependent) truthmaker
(Athens is hosting the Olympics in 2500 AD ∨ A city other than
Athens is hosting the Olympics in 2500 AD ) ∧¬ (Athens is hosting
the Olympics in 2500 AD ∧ A city other than Athens is hosting the
Olympics in 2500 AD )
which is true at x (according to the Charitable View) iff for every history con-
taining x, in 2500 AD either the Olympics is being hosted by Athens or by
some other city but simultaneously by Athens and another city — which let
us suppose is in fact the case. So (unlike under the Elite View) this banality
does indeed come out true. The sentence ‘In 2500 AD Athens will host the
Olympics’, on the other hand, comes out as not knowably true or false, since
in some histories through x it is true and in others false. But this is perfectly
in accord with everyday impressions of the openness of the future and with our
native’s perfectly sensible decision to give (as it happens) probability 0.4 to this
outcome, rather than 1 (determinately true) or 0 (determinately false).
So, what is the correct move: to abandon the philosophers’ original (linear-
time) analysis of semantics, or to abandon the assumption that ordinary natives
by and large have reasonable beliefs about the future? In one sense there is no
definitive answer to give. For the natives’ conceptual scheme, as a whole, fails
to fit perfectly with reality, and so needs to be modified; yet if we accept (with
Quine, Davidson, Lewis, et al) that the criterion of validity for a conceptual
scheme are ultimately somewhat holistic, then there may be no absolute fact of
the matter as to which part of a holistically wrong scheme is to be abandoned.
Nonetheless, as a practical matter there are enormously strong reasons why
the ‘correct’ move is to abandon the Elite View. For one thing, in doing so we
have to accept as wrong only those parts of the natives’ understanding of belief
and desire talk which come from a fairly theoretical analysis — furthermore,
one motivated (ex hypothesi) by a wildly wrong picture of what the universe
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as a whole is like. By contrast, in clinging to the Elite View we preserve the
truth-value of the writings of native philosophers, but at the cost of abandoning
the truth of most ordinary conversation about the future.
(As an analogy, consider a variant on Putnam’s Twin-Earth example (Put-
nam 1973). There is a general consensus that, if transported to Twin-Earth
and given a glass of XY Z, I’m incorrect to say ‘that’s water’, and correct to
say ‘water is H2O’. We interpret my language so that ‘water’ refers to H2O —
even at the cost of making most of my post-arrival statements about water come
out false — because this is the most explanatory interpretation of my linguistic
community’s overall language use.
But now suppose that I never left Earth at all, but that in fact the stuff
in the rivers and seas has always been XY Z. Only the tireless efforts of an
International Conspiracy of Chemists has kept the public — even quite edu-
cated members of the public, such as those with chemistry degrees — duped
into thinking that this stuff is H2O. When investigative journalists expose the
Conspiracy, how should we react? Surely not by clinging to our technical, theo-
retical belief that water is H2O — thus preserving a few technical truths at the
cost of making almost all the population’s beliefs about water turn out false —
but rather by acknowledging that water was XY Z all along and accepting that
the technical connection between water and H2O is simply false.)
Furthermore (though it is a related point), if we ask what justifies our seman-
tics of the natives’ language, it is hard to see how we could motivate the Elite
View given the actual (i.e. branching) nature of the natives’ universe. For it has
been powerfully argued (by Quine (1960) and Lewis (1975), for instance) that
some sort of principle of charity must apply to translation and interpretation
of a genuinely foreign language. That is, if we have a proposed interpretation
of such a language according to which nearly all uses of a large part of that
language turn out not to be true (or possibly not even to be meaningful) then
that seems simply to count against the accuracy of that proposed interpreta-
tion. Judged by this standard, the Elite View should be abandoned as being
overwhelmingly less charitable than the Charitable View.
For these reasons, I claim, the correct semantics for the natives’ language,
and the correct analysis of their beliefs and desires, is that given by the Chari-
table View: that is, by applying branching-time semantics. The native philoso-
phers, whose proposed semantics is motivated by an entirely reasonable but
entirely false view of their world, are simply wrong in their understanding of
their own language’s semantics. And of course, since their world could well be
our own world except for some trivial simplifications, if our own world has the
branching structure that quantum mechanics suggest then the correct semantics
of our own languages are really branching.
5 Probability and uncertainty
An objection remains to be responded to: I have argued that charity considera-
tions require us to adopt branching-time semantics and thus to take an attitude
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of uncertainty towards the results of experiments which have different results
in different branches. But how can it even make sense to ‘take an attitude of
uncertainty’ towards the future when we know all the relevant facts?
This objection is frequently brought up in informal discussions of the Everett
interpretation; it has been made explicitly by Greaves (2004), who writes:
I can feel uncertain over P only if I think that there is a fact of the
matter regarding P of which I am ignorant.
This objection can be responded to on its own terms, by noting that it is
ambiguous between a truism of ordinary language and a technical claim. As the
former, it is indeed plausible to say that if a supposed concept of ‘uncertainty’
says that we can be uncertain about something without there being something
to be uncertain about, then it does not deserve the name ‘uncertainty’. However,
there is something about which I am uncertain if I am uncertain about whether
Athens will host the Olympics: trivially, that ‘something’ is whether Athens will
host the Olympics. Or if preferred, it is about whether “Athens will host the
Olympics” will be true.13
The less trivial reading of Greaves’ comment is that it asserts that we can-
not be uncertain about something unless there is a third-party fact — a fact
expressible via branch-talk sentences — about which to be uncertain. But now
it is far from clear what motivates Greaves to accept this technical claim. This
doubt is strengthened when we note that most philosophers do not accept the
claim even in the absence of branching: the ‘problem of the essential indexical’
(Perry (1979), Lewis (1979)) seems amply to demonstrate that there are other
sorts of ignorance which are not ignorance of third-party-accessible facts but
are unavoidably indexical.
It would be to miss the point to respond to this objection by retreating to the
claim that we cannot be uncertain about something unless there is either a third-
party-accessible fact about which to be uncertain, or an indexical aspect to our
ignorance. The point is that we didn’t realise that some ignorance was indexical
until it occurred to authors such as Perry to consider some such situation, to
describe it in everyday language, and to note that we intuitively classify such
situations as ignorance even though no relevant third-party-accessible facts are
unknown. Essentially the same has occurred in the case of Everettian branching:
describe it in everyday language (using the charity argument to tell us that
‘everyday language’ has a branching-time semantics) and it is intuitively clear
that it is another situation of ignorance.
(I should note in passing that on the ‘Lewisian semantics’ to be described in
the next section, indexical ignorance is actually all that we need: the ‘essential
indexical’ is my history. This strategy will not work for the other semantic
proposals made in that section, though.)
There is also a more positive defence of the use of probability and uncertainty
talk in the face of branching. After all, even in the absence of branching no
13‘Will be true’, not ‘is true’, of course; to find out whether it will be true, wait and see.
See Prior (1967, pp. 122-3) and Ryle (1964, pp. 15–34) for more on the mild linguistic tangles
involved in this wait-and-see notion of truth-conditions.
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reductive analysis is given of what it means to assign probability 0.4 to the
truth of some such proposition. Rather, the meaning of the statement is given
implicitly, as part of a decision-theoretic analysis which treats ‘more likely than’
and ‘preferable to’ as theoretical terms whose engagement with empirical fact
is via their role in the best explanation of my actual behavioural dispositions.
The same applies to the case of branching-time semantics — it’s just that the
set of propositions has a slightly different conceptual sense. (For more on this
issue see section 5 of Wallace (2005)).
6 ‘Not-knowably-true-or-false’: semantic details
So far, I have presented the formal structure of branching semantics and pro-
vided an argument from the principle of charity that they are applicable in a
branching universe. However, I have so far been rather unspecific as to how this
semantics is to be understood — and in particular as to what meaning is to be
ascribed to the ‘not-knowably-true-or-false’ label which I applied to sentences
which are true in some but not all histories. In this section I will attempt to
remedy this, by providing three different strategies by which ‘not-knowably-
true-or-false’ may be understood.
The most straightforward such strategy might be called minimalist seman-
tics, and it takes ‘not-knowably-true-or-false’ at face value, as a third truth-
value: ‘indefinite’ (with the semantics of that truth value understood according
to supervaluationist logic: that is, an utterance of a tenseless sentence s is true
(false) at x iff s is true (false) in all branches containing x). This has the ad-
vantage of simplicity; it also accords well with the intuitions of an ‘open future’
which led Prior to tense logic in the first place. On the other hand, it requires us
to accept the failure of bivalence, with the consequent logical difficulties (in par-
ticular, a rejection of Tarski’s truth biconditionals, which lead to contradiction
in the absence of bivalence14).
An alternative strategy, which we might call ambiguity semantics, was sug-
gested to me by Simon Saunders (in conversation). Suppose that just as a tensed
sentence is associated with a certain tenseless sentence, a tenseless sentence is
associated with a certain ‘branch-talk’ sentence (e.g. ‘in branch x, Y happens’).
However, whereas in the tensed case it is usually unambiguous which tenseless
sentence is associated with an utterance, in the branching case it is often highly
ambiguous. This ambiguity often means that even a tenseless sentence cannot
be given a truth value; however, if it comes out true under all the disambigua-
tions then it is true, period. (Saunders has used the example of a proper name:
if I use ‘David’ as a name for the 4-dimensional cradle-to-grave David, then
14The Tarski biconditional for the sentence ‘it will rain tomorrow’ is “ ‘It will rain tomorrow’
is true iff it will rain tomorrow”, which has the form “ ‘It will rain tomorrow’ is true iff P”;
similarly, the biconditional for ‘It will not rain tomorrow’ is “ ‘It will not rain tomorrow’ is
true iff it will not rain tomorrow”, which has the form “ ‘It will rain tomorrow’ is false iff
∼ P”. If it is neither true that it will rain tomorrow nor true that it won’t, we can derive
(P& ∼ P ). See, e. g. , Williamson (1994, pp. 187–197) for a more detailed presentation of this
argument.
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it is unavoidably ambiguous which of the vastly many Davids I am actually
referring to. However, the semantics of a branching universe cannot reduce to
the ambiguity of proper names, because many future-directed statements we
might wish to make (e. g. , ‘there will be a war next year’) contain no names at
all.) Ambiguity semantics ‘demystifies’ the ‘indefinite’ truth value, making it
simply an unavoidable consequence of our inability to refer uniquely to future
branches; it has the technical advantage of maintaining bivalence, at least at
the theoretical level.
Motivation for yet a third strategy15 comes from the philosophy of personal
identity: in particular, from considerations of ‘personal fission’, the dividing of
an individual into two or more copies (by means of, for instance, dividing the
brain in two or using a Star Trek-style teletransporter), which has been used by
Parfit (1984) to criticise the whole concept of personal identity. David Lewis,
seeking (in Lewis 1976) to reconcile common-sense views of identity with the
case of fission, proposed that when fission occurs in an person’s life there are
two persons present all the time — it’s just that they have shared person-stages
until the fission. Extending this to a branching universe, the natural move is to
regard a classical world not as an instantaneous thing (an element of S, in our
previous notation), but as an entire history consisting of instantaneous ‘world-
stages’. It would follow that there is no branching of worlds, simply various
periods when worlds cease to share world-stages.
The strategy, which we could call Lewisian semantics, might seem to suffer
from extravagant multiplying of entities. If there are already multiple identical-
at-a-time worlds prior to branching then there are multiple utterances, multiple
agents, multiple labs, etc. On the other hand, if we subscribe to an ontological
framework where higher-level ontology is to be understood as structures present
in lower-level ontology (as defended in general by Dennett (1991) and Ross,
Ladyman, Spurrett, and Collier (2006), and in the case of quantum mechanics
by Wallace (2003a)), it does not seem unreasonable to regard such a structure
as a property of a history rather than an instant — especially as it is likely to
be quite temporally extended relative to the branching timescales (at least, this
is true in the case of quantum mechanics).
Furthermore, the resultant semantics is extremely straightforward, and has
no need of truth-value gaps: “The result of the experiment will be Up”, uttered
in world w before branching, is true iff in w the result is indeed Up. The
simplification is possible because the physical event which serves as a world-
stage for the utterance in w is also a world-stage for another utterance in another
world w′. In one of w and w′ the result is Up, in the other it is Down. No rational
agent prior to branching should commit to which result he will see, but there is
still a fact of the matter.
The difference between Lewisian and ambiguity semantics maps reasonably
well onto Sider’s (Sider 2001, pp. 60–1) distinction between the ‘Worm View’ and
the ‘Stage View’ of how our ordinary talk about persisting objects relates to the
sequence of temporal parts making up those objects’ histories. The Worm View,
15Suggested in conversation by various people, notably Simon Saunders.
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identifying an object with its entire history, leads (ceteris paribus) to Lewisian
semantics; the Stage View, identifying an object with an instantaneous temporal
part, leads to ambiguity semantics, or possibly to minimalism.16
Detailed considerations from philosophy of language are likely to bear on
which (if any!) of these three alternatives is preferable. For instance, Lewisian
semantics gives a very clear formula for reference: in that semantics, an ut-
terance can be regarded as an ordered pair of a microphysical event x and a
complete history h, and a referential expression in the utterance refers to what-
ever thing in h it would have referred to on our conventional view of semantics if
we regarded h as the only history. On the other hand, it is unclear what causal
story could be told as to how this reference occurs (unless we wish to regard
causation as itself emergent and branch-relative), since nothing intrinsic about
the microphysical x ties it to a particular history.17
By contrast, no unique formula for reference can be given at all in ambi-
guity semantics: indeed, it is an explicit requirement of the system that most
referential terms fail to refer uniquely when used of the future. This seems to
put ambiguity semantics in direct conflict with what Gareth Evans has called
Russell’s Principle (Evans 1982): the principle that in order to refer successfully,
I must know to what unique thing I am referring.
However, I do not wish to attempt here to adjudicate between the various
semantic proposals that I have suggested: further discussion would involve too
many controversies and would go beyond the scope of this paper. I rather
suspect that there may not really even be any fact of the matter as to which
is correct: here perhaps, even if nowhere else, radical interpretation can lead to
indeterminacy of translation, as Quine (1960) urged long ago.
7 Propositions
In presenting branching semantics, and the arguments for it, I have chosen to
speak of tenseless sentences and their truth-values in the hope of acheiving a pre-
sentation as neutral as possible between various different semantic schemes. The
conclusion of the charity argument — that one who knows his future involves
branching should adopt an attitude of uncertainty towards his post-branching
state — does not, so far as I can see, depend on any specific theory of meaning.
One particular semantic proposal, however, seems worth discussing in more
detail, both because it is interestingly affected by the assumption of a branching
world and because it is currently rather popular in many circles. This is the
16A third possible view, not considered by Sider but suggested to me in conversation by
Simon Saunders, is that an object at a time should be identified with its history up to that
time; this view avoids the double-counting of the Worm View in the presence of branching, and
leads to the same semantics as for the Stage View given that we are allowing only futurewards
branching.
17For these sort of reasons, Lewis himself claimed (Lewis 1983, pp. 73–76) that neither one
of a pair of individuals who will be undergoing fission can refer to himself and not his twin
until the fission occurs; as such he would in effect reject ‘Lewisian’ semantics! (I am grateful
to Oliver Pooley for this observation.)
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‘possible worlds’ semantics developed by Kripke (1981), Stalnaker (1999), Lewis
(1975), et al, according to which, in crude outline:
• Utterances express propositions;
• The proposition expressed by an utterance is a function of the context in
which that utterance is made;
• Propositions are sets of possible worlds, possible ‘ways the world might
be’;
• A proposition P is true at a world w if w ∈ P .
In this framework the difference between tensed and tenseless utterances
is that the proposition expressed by the former is dependent on the time of
utterance, the proposition expressed by the latter is not.18
In branching-time semantics, it is clear, a possible world is ‘a way a particular
history could be’, not a way that the entire branching structure could be. For
the difference between the Elite and the Charitable Views, then, is that on the
Elite View a possible world is a way that the entire branching structure could
be; on the Charitable View it is a way that a single history in the branching
structure could be. This has the consequence that in the Elite View most of our
everyday utterances do not seem to express propositions at all, whereas in the
Charitable View it is straightforward which proposition is expressed, but less
straightforward how the truth-value of that utterance is determined from the
history-dependent truth-value of the proposition expressed by it.
It is instructive to see how the various semantic proposals of section 6 look
in the language of propositions. Lewisian semantics is straightforward: to each
utterance is assigned a unique history, and the utterance is true iff the propo-
sition expressed by the utterance is true in the history in which the utterance
was made. Minimalist semantics, characteristically, offers simply a brute rule:
an utterance made at x is true iff the proposition expressed by the utterance is
true in all histories containing x.
Ambiguity semantics is more interesting. The natural strategy would be to
regard it as ambiguous which proposition was expressed by a given utterance,
and this is particularly natural in the case of proper names which Saunders con-
sidered. For suppose that my colleague Fred is to make a quantum measurement
with two possible results: Up and Down. Call the two post-measurement Freds
Fred1 (who sees Up), and Fred2 (who sees Down). If, pre-measurement, I utter
‘Fred [tenselessly] sees Up’, perhaps it is ambiguous whether my utterance of
‘Fred’ refers to Fred1 or to Fred2, and hence whether the proposition which I
express is the proposition that Fred1 sees Up (which is true) or the proposition
that Fred2 sees Up (which is false). It is less clear where the ambiguity in ut-
terances like ‘there will be a war next year’ lies, but presumably it lies in the
implicit ‘on this planet’ which comes with such utterances.
18Ignoring examples where the time of utterance has relevant ‘non-tense’ implications: for
instance, ‘the Queen’ in ‘the Queen is [tenselessly] called Elizabeth’ denotes a different object
when uttered in 1850 than in 2005.
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I should note that even if possible worlds are usually to be construed as
ways a history might be, there will be some contexts in which they must be
understood as the Elite View requires, as ways that the entire branching reality
might be: in particular, we may want to discuss possible states of that branching
reality; we may also wish to use possible worlds in this second sense to ground
the semantics of the branch-talk sentences we use when we actually describe this
branching reality. However, this does not seem particularly problematic either
for the Charitable View or for possible-worlds semantics in general.
8 Possibilities
When I say that some future event is possible, sometimes I speak simply of
epistemic possibility, so that ‘possibly P ’ means just ‘I do not know that P is
false’. As we have seen, the charity argument tells us:
• That if I know that it is true that P on some history containing my current
location in the branching structure, then I should assent to ‘possibly P ’.
• That if I know that it is true that P on no such history then I should
reject ‘possibly P ’.
Sometimes, however, we seem to use possibility in a non-epistemic sense (as
might be the case for physical, historical, logical possibility, etc.) It is fairly
clear that if P is true of some history through x, then ‘possibly P ’ must also be
true at x: that which cannot in principle be ruled out should not be impossible.
However, nothing in the charity argument entails that the converse holds: that
for ‘possibly P ’ to be true at x, P must be true at some history through x.
This is not to say that some philosophically relevant notion of possibility
could be defined via
‘possibly P ’ is true at x iff P is true in some history containing x;
indeed, as far as I can see anyone tempted by the purely philosophical arguments
for branching time should embrace this notion of possibility, for it seems to
provide all that the advocates of such arguments desire of ‘objective possibility’.
But this is not to say that it is required that this particular notion of prob-
ability has conceptual significance. As I mentioned in the Introduction, I am
myself sceptical that free will, causation et al require a branching-time picture.
This raises the question of how those analyses of possibility which traditionally
have no notion of branching time fare under the branching-world hypothesis.
In this context, recall that Lewis (1986) defined possibility relative to some
pre-defined class X of ‘possible worlds’ (such as the physically permitted worlds,
or the physically permitted worlds compatible with some data x, etc.): P is
possible relative to this class iff it is true for some world w in the class. (See
also Taylor and Dennett (2001) for a development of this position.) For future-
directed possibility statements (that is, for statements of the form ‘it is possible
that Athens will host the Olympics in 2500 AD’, rather than of the form ‘it is
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possible that Hitler won the Second World War’) it is a requirement that the
actual world is in X.
Branching-time semantics makes only a slight alteration to this framework.
In such a semantics (ignoring Lewisian semantics) there is no unique ‘actual
history’ but rather a set of such histories: all those through the point x at which
the possibility statement is considered. Any future-directed notion of possibility,
defined via a set X of possible worlds (i. e. , histories) and assessed at some point
x, is coherent only if the entire set of histories through x is contained within
X. As far as I can see, this alteration does not have profound effects for the
possible-worlds analyses of possibility. (Also note that on Lewisian semantics,
everything is almost exactly as in the absence of branching, with exactly one
world ‘actual’ relative to a given utterance.)
9 Conclusion
If the only consistent ways to explain the semantics of tensed talk all assume
a certain structural property of time, then that would indeed be a reason to
assume that time does have that structure. This is not the case for the question
of the linearity or otherwise of time: though I see no reason to doubt that
nothing in our experience rules out linear time and linear semantics, I have
argued here that if time (or ‘the world’ if you prefer) is actually branching, then
the correct semantics must also be branching.
As such, the semantics of tense are more naturalistic than meets the eye. If
the right semantics for tense depends on the structure of time, we can be no
more certain of our semantic theory than of our theory of temporal structure.
(Perhaps this shouldn’t be too surprising: if linguistic meaning supervenes on
linguistic behaviour and if the correct third-party description of linguistic be-
haviour depends on facts about the world about which we are ignorant, then
our theory of linguistic meaning should inherit that ignorance.)
In particular, if the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is true, our
universe is branching. In such a situation, we are required to assume that the se-
mantics for our language is itself branching. The apparent conceptual paradoxes
of the branching-universe are caused by insisting instead, without justification
and against the principle of charity, on adopting linear-time semantics.
Once we recognise the semantic implications of the branching-universe hy-
pothesis, we realise that the statement ‘either A or B will occur, but not both,
and I don’t know which’, uttered at some point x in the branching structure of
the Universe, becomes a perfectly rational thing for someone to say if A occurs
in some of the branches futurewards of x and B occurs in the others. A rational
agent at x (and who knows the above facts) would assert the truth of ‘either A
or B will occur’ (for in every branch one or the other occurs) and the falsity of
‘both A and B will occur’ (for in no branch do both occur) but will assert nei-
ther the truth nor the falsity of ‘A will occur’ and ‘B will occur’, for each occurs
in some but not all branches futurewards of x. As such, an interpretation of
quantum mechanics in which experiments cause the Universe to branch has no
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difficulty in explaining why experimenters are entirely justified when, as they
routinely do, they express ignorance as to the outcome of their experiments.
If so, one of the major conceptual objections to the Everett interpretation of
quantum mechanics is unfounded.
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